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ABSTRACT
This is a description of the conceptual foundations used for
designing a novel learning environment for mechanics
implemented as an Industrial Educational Laboratory – called Fisica
in Moto (FiM) – at the Ducati Foundation in Bologna. In this paper,
we will describe the motivation for and design of the conceptual
approach to mechanics used in the lab – as such, the paper is
theoretical in nature. The goal of FiM is to provide an approach to
the teaching of mechanics based upon imaginative structures
found in continuum physics suitable to engineering and science.
We show how continuum physics creates models of mechanical
phenomena by using momentum and angular momentum as
primitive quantities. We analyse this approach in terms of
cognitive linguistic concepts such as conceptual metaphor and
narrative framing of macroscopic physical phenomena. The model
discussed here has been used in the didactical design of the
actual lab and raises questions for an investigation of student
learning of mechanics in a narrative setting.
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1. Introduction
Learning to understand mechanics is not easy, but it is crucially important at many levels
of expertise in the industry. This observation and social responsibility were some of the
driving forces that led the Ducati Foundation to establish what we call an Industrial Edu-
cational Laboratory (IEL) for mechanics. The name Fisica in Moto (FiM) was chosen for
this laboratory.1 The original motivation was to provide a learning environment for young
people that would allow them to experience, and maybe even work on, authentic appli-
cations of physics in industrial mechanics. At the urging of the foundation, a beautiful
and richly outfitted laboratory for mechanics in automotive applications was built
between 2006 and 2008 at the Ducati factories in Bologna, Italy. It opened its doors to
groups of high school students in the academic year 2008–2009.
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It was felt that the lack of authenticity of much of standard school physics made the
subject removed from real life – an aspect that makes it boring and turns it into an
unnecessarily difficult subject. The usual excuse is that physics is, by nature, a formal
and difficult enterprise that forces us to use examples that will necessarily have to be sim-
plified to the point of being fake; this is exacerbated by the fact that it is hard to come by
experimental environments that allow access to authentic applications of (industrial)
mechanics (see, for example, Hake, 1998; King & Ritchie, 2012). Still, it was clear for
the members of the Foundation that simply providing young students with a well-
equipped laboratory would not, by itself, alleviate the problems learners have with a
science such as physics. A concerted effort at renewing the didactic approach to concep-
tualisations in mechanics was called for as well.
We know from physics education research over the last few decades that there are yet
other reasons for the difficulty students experience with learning physics (Clement, 1982;
Fuchs, 1987; Halloun & Hestenes, 1985; Hestenes, Wells, & Swackhamer, 1992; McDer-
mott, 1984). If we focus on dynamics, we see that there is a general confusion concerning
the term force that is borrowed from natural (everyday) language and formalised in mech-
anics. For example, expressions, such as inertia is a force, force of velocity, force is energy or
vice versa, active forces and reactive forces, introduce the nonscientific meaning of the term
and contribute to the confusion. In addition, more general expressions such as the moral
force of an individual, or the social forces that act in a democracy, give the term an even
broader contour.
Here are examples of what might be called common-sense forms of reasoning about
motion that have been identified in the literature cited in the previous paragraph (see
also Brookes & Etkina, 2009). Rest is the natural state of bodies and every motion
needs a force that causes it (Aristotelian physics). To move an object, a force must over-
come a preexisting force (weight, inertia, a force due to motion). A force is required to
sustain motion. A constant force produces uniform motion, an increasing force pro-
duces an accelerated motion. When an object is thrown, the subject imparts motive
force to the object, an impetus, which sustains the body’s motion until it is dissipated
(Buridan’s physics). In a collision, the body that causes the collision exerts a force for
which there is a reacting resistance force exerted by the other body; the greater of
the two forces defines which wins. In general, a greater mass exerts a stronger force
than a smaller mass. These and many other examples known from decades of investi-
gations of understanding of motion demonstrate that learners have a major problem
with the concept of force, and in general with mechanics. In this paper, we will
suggest a different approach to the conceptualisation of motion – one that makes use
of the idea that mechanical phenomena are the result of the storage and transfer of
quantity of motion (and quantity of rotational motion for phenomena involving rotating
bodies).
For these reasons, the Ducati Foundation charged one of us (F. Corni) with designing
didactic elements of the IEL. Work on this started in 2008. In short, our approach inte-
grates three major elements we learn from (1) modern cognitive science, (2) continuum
physics that uses an embodied2 perspective, and (3) dynamical systems modelling. In
all, these elements have suggested to us to create an imaginative approach to the concep-
tualisation of mechanical phenomena. Here are some details concerning these three
elements.
2 F. CORNI ET AL.
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(1) Take, for instance, aspects put into sharp focus by the model of embodied cognition
(Gibbs, 2006; Shapiro, 2011; Wilson, 2002). There, we learn about the importance of
imagination and figurative thought for understanding the world around us – language
and thought are metaphoric and narrative, driven by imagination. We use narrative
forms to make sense of much that goes on in life. Briefly put, this is because we perceive
natural, social, and psychological forces3 that are conceptualised (talked about) as agents
that drive events or are driven (by other agents) – such figures of mind allow us to put our
understanding in the form of stories (Fuchs, 2015). Moreover, abstraction is an early
element of life (not a late one as a result of a long education). Abstract thought is made
possible by our metaphoric mind and we see it reflected in natural everyday language.
Taken together, these and many other aspects of the model of embodied cognition let
us believe that we should not summarily reject what common-sense reasoning and the
use of natural language provide to us; rather, we should see how to build formal, theoretic
knowledge upon embodied forms of understanding that include natural language, meta-
phor, and narrative.
(2) Secondly, continuum physics (the physical science of macroscopic systems and pro-
cesses; Truesdell & Noll, 1965; Truesdell & Toupin, 1960) provides us with imaginative
forms of understanding of motion as well. If we inquire into these imaginative forms
(Fuchs, 2014), we realise that they are largely the same as those used to make sense of
the world around us in everyday life. In particular, translational and rotational motion
are experienced and conceptualised as forces of nature (in the sense of what is explained
in Note 2). In Section 3, we will see how to analyse theories in continuum physics with the
help of tools developed in cognitive linguistics that reveal figurative structures in this
formal science. Briefly stated, in continuum physics, momentum and angular momentum
are the extensive quantities of motion that are imagined to be stored in bodies and are
transferred through materials and fields and from body to body. Potential differences
(differences of velocity and angular velocity) are driving forces of such transfers, and
the combination of potential differences and transports of the extensive quantities gives
a sense of the power of a process. A slightly less formal use of language – as is quite
normal in presentations of continuum mechanics – shows that we can conceptualise
momentum and angular momentum as agents whose ‘doings’ in mechanical systems
explain how to understand motion – they are the agents of (mechanical) change.
(3) Finally, modern (educational) technology does not only provide us with fancy
equipment for laboratories and data acquisition but also with computer-based tools for
modelling of dynamical systems. If we restrict ourselves to models of (spatially)
uniform dynamical systems, we may use well-known and easy-to-use system dynamics
modelling tools for creating interesting models of even quite complex and relevant appli-
cations (Fuchs, 1996/2010, 2002). Interestingly, these programs use a form of metaphoric
graphical language that reflects basic metaphoric structures used in common-sense
reasoning and that form a core element of formal physical theories as well.
We can now say why we believe that a narrative approach to mechanics is possible and
what it consists of. It is made possible because we perceive motion as a force and concep-
tualise it and aspects of it with the help of figurative forms. It consists of a principled use of
narratives for recounting embodied (kinaesthetic) experience; such narratives include the
seeds for an understanding of motion, they help suggest ideas for how the (mechanical)
world works.4
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In this paper, we will describe the conceptual foundations of the FiM lab at Ducati in
Bologna as they relate to continuum physics, to cognitive science, and to their interaction
and integration (Sections 3 and 4). To give the reader a feeling for how the IEL might
work, and to prepare the development of our model of a narrative approach to mechanics,
we will first present an example of a phenomenon of rotational motion and its narrative
framing as it is used in the Ducati IEL (Section 2). In Section 3, we start the discussion
of our model by introducing notions from cognitive science with an emphasis on
modern theories of metaphor and narrative. In Section 4, we will informally describe
continuum mechanics and show how we can identify imaginative structures in equations,
expressions, and descriptions found in this science. Moreover, we show how dynamical
models of uniform systems can be created using the same figurative structures. Following
this, we will make the point that mechanics may be framed narratively. We will then
discuss what we see emanating from a model of a narrative approach to mechanics
for the design of IELs and for the kind of learning we expect to be possible in such
environments (Section 5). Section 6 is a brief summary of the main arguments put
forth in this paper.
2. An example of rotational motion
In this section, we shall briefly describe an element of pedagogy as it occurs in FiM without
going into an empirical investigation of the Ducati lab. Our hope is to give the reader an
impression of the real-life learning environment before we venture into describing, in
some detail, the aspects underlying its design.
The FiM laboratory has existed now for a number of years and has been visited by a
great number of students working on various applications of (automotive) mechanics.
For this reason, we have some knowledge about how students experience mechanical
phenomena at the various experimental stations in the lab. Here is a (narrative) descrip-
tion and explanation of a phenomenon of rotational motion at one of the stations; it is
called the Angular Momentum Carousel.5 In this experiment, we allow the students an
opportunity to have a strong kinaesthetic experience (feel the acceleration and the dizzi-
ness of spinning, the stress in the arms and body when pushing the beam) and gradually
learn how to explain what is experienced in terms of good natural language.
A three-metre long horizontal steel beam that rotates with low friction around a vertical
axis passing through the midpoint, a motorbike-like seat and a counterweight constitute
the merry-go-round workstation (Figure 1).
A set of numerical data taken during a typical course of events is shown in Figure 2.
(The data are taken with a gyro sensor and displayed on the dashboard.) A student
takes the seat on the saddle while other students push the beam from outside the carousel
to start the system rotating – angular speed is going up (phase A). As soon as the students
stop pushing, the angular speed starts going down (phase B). When the student riding the
beam moves the saddle closer to the centre of the beam, the angular speed goes up (phase
C). Finally, without any further intervention, the angular speed decreases over a longer
period of time – fast at first, more slowly later on (phase D).
The first observation is that, when accelerating the beam from outside, pushing is more
effective if done at the far ends of the beam, perpendicularly to the beam itself. Here are a
couple of conclusions:6
4 F. CORNI ET AL.
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Quantity of rotational motion (angular momentum) is given to/transferred to the bar by the
students. This requires effort and it is noted that, if the floor where they stand could move, it
would rotate in the opposite direction of that of the bar. It is concluded that angular momen-
tum is pumped by the students from the ground to the bar.
Angular momentum is contained in the rotating system.
The angular momentum in a body cannot change by itself. (First Law of dynamics for
rotational motion)
Once the bar reaches a certain angular velocity, the students stop pushing. The bar con-
tinues rotating while slowing down and will stop after a relatively long time.
Figure 1. The Carousel of Angular Momentum workstation. Note the beam, seat, counterweights, and
the vertical axis of rotation.
Figure 2. Angular speed for a typical operation of the angular momentum carousel.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENCE EDUCATION 5
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The angular momentum contained in the rotating system flows into the ground as a conse-
quence of friction between the beam and its support. This happens as long as there is a differ-
ence of angular speed between the bar and the ground. Measurement shows that the flow –
the rate at which angular momentum is lost – is stronger if (difference of) angular speed is
higher.
While rotating, the experimenter can activate an electric motor that moves the saddle and
the counterweight symmetrically, along the beam. When the weights move towards the
axis of rotation, the angular velocity goes up, and vice versa, without any external contri-
bution (no transfer of angular momentum). In analogy to linear momentum, no angular
momentum transfer means no change in the angular momentum stored in the system.
The increase in the angular velocity of the beam with the weights moving towards the
rotation axis is associated with a reduction of the rotational inertia (moment of inertia),
the quantity analogous to inertial mass. The rotational inertia depends upon the mass
of the rotating system, but also upon the spatial distribution of the elements, i.e. their dis-
tance from the rotational axis.
A rotating body contains angular momentum and its rotational inertia can be thought of as
the capacitance of angular momentum.
The rotational inertia increases with mass and with the distance of the mass from the axis of
rotation.
This is an example of results reached by students taking a relatively short tour of the lab-
oratory. What we have called ‘conclusions’ resulting from the discussions between stu-
dents and tour guides are examples of narrative understanding of mechanical
phenomena – this point should become clear when we outline the theoretical foundations
of our laboratory design that is presented in Sections 3 and 4.
When the lab is used for a summer school for gifted Italian high school students (a year
before graduation), much more is made of this example and, in particular, the expla-
nations are formalised – put into mathematical form – by producing system dynamics
models. The link between verbal form and formalised results will be described in more
detail in Section 4.
3. Metaphor and narrative framing
In this section, we will introduce the idea of imaginative rationality and show how it is
related to the figurative structures of metaphor and narrative. This requires discussing
at least a little bit of background material concerning embodied cognition.
Since a description of the theory of physics we are using, i.e. continuum physics, will
only be presented in Section 4, our discussion here will be concerned with perception
and cognition in general and the role of metaphor and narrative in our conceptualisations
of experience. However, we will already make references to our interaction with nature
and to science where this is deemed necessary and useful and where we do not need
the specific knowledge of the theories of macroscopic physics.
To make this clear from the outset, we take an embodied stance to questions of cogni-
tion. This is not just reflected in our ideas concerning didactics but rather makes itself felt
directly in our approach to an analysis of physical science and its formal structures. We
believe that it is possible to show convincingly that physics is a product of embodied
6 F. CORNI ET AL.
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minds resulting from our interaction with nature and machines. Recently, we have been
able to observe a convergence of new approaches to the formulation of continuum
physics and a new understanding of the workings of our mind (Section 4).
3.1. The embodied mind and imagination
Concepts summarised under the title of embodied cognition have been a long time in the
making. We can trace them back to critical philosophical traditions such as American
Pragmatism (Dewey, 1925) and phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1965). In recent
decades, the philosophy of mind that has evolved from these early steps has developed
into a major force in cognitive science (see Chemero, 2009; Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1992; von Foerster, 2003).
We have been influenced by approaches to embodied cognition found in cognitive lin-
guistics. Cognitive linguistics brings us concepts and opens new fields for research such as
image schemas (Hampe, 2005; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987), force dynamics (Talmy, 2000),
conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999), frames (Fillmore, 1975), domains
(Langacker, 1987, 1991),mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1994), and conceptual integration net-
works (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner, 1996). The studies mentioned here and many
others demonstrate how traditional views of metaphor lead us astray when considering
how the human mind works –metaphors are elements of human thought and rationality,
not simply poetic embellishments or, worse still, simply falsehoods that should and could
be replaced by literal accounts. Figurative language reflects a figuratively and imaginatively
working mind.
Expressed differently, approaches to cognition that apply notions of the embodi-
ment of mind remind us that language or, more generally, our linguistic products,
do not have a direct relationship with the world out there. Rather, words relate to
conceptual structures in our mind that result from the interaction of our bodies
with their physical and social environments. Assuming this philosophical stance, the
above should be true of the words we speak and the equations we write in physics
as well (Fuchs, 2006; Hestenes, 2006). Physics is an imaginative product of an embo-
died mind (Fuchs, 2015) – which does not mean that the world out there is only
imagined. When we speak and write about nature, however, we should remind our-
selves that we understand the world with the help of those mental resources that
brought us physics in the first place.
Results in cognitive linguistics have not gone unnoticed in studies of science learning.7
It is fair to say that these studies have shed new light upon the older question of conceptual
change that has moved much of science education research for well over the last 30 years
(Amin, Jeppsson, & Haglund, 2015).
3.2. Figurative structures and our understanding of nature and science
More specifically, studies of embodied cognition in linguistics as well as in psychology
have unearthed structures of mind (such as image schemas, metaphors, and narratives)
that would best be called schematic, figurative, or generally imaginative. Propositions
that are supposed to be taken literally are more the exception than the rule
(Gibbs, 1994).
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENCE EDUCATION 7
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3.2.1. Conceptual metaphor
We understand much of the world around us through mental devices such as (conceptual)
metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). Take an apparently innocent expression such as
his remark almost bowled me over, but I quickly found my footing. This is simply conven-
tional language, we do not stop and wonder what has been said; we all understand its
meaning perfectly well. However, it is profoundly metaphoric and we would be hard
put to find a literal form that expresses what the example actually conveys. How is this
example metaphoric? Conceptual metaphors are projections of knowledge, structures,
and logic from a source domain onto a target domain. Behind our example expression,
we see at least two metaphors, WORDS ARE A MOVING FORCE and COMPOSURE IS EQUILI-
BRIUM. These metaphors are (unconscious) structures of mind – however, they can be
brought to our awareness and thus become tools of reasoning. The expression itself is
not considered a metaphor but rather a concrete linguistic example making the meta-
phor(s) evident to the observer.
Quite obviously, the source domains in our two metaphors stem from physically embo-
died perception – here they originate from perception of physical force and equilibrium. In
the example, this type of experience is projected upon the realm of social and emotional
experience of an exchange between two persons and its emotional effect.
3.2.2. Image schemas
In common language, we find many examples of metaphoric projection where the source
is (physical) perception and motor activity. The most minimal source domains are sensor-
imotor gestalts (schematised perceptual units). Mark Johnson and George Lakoff, whose
Metaphors We Live By started much of conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson,
1980, 1999) call these image schemas (Hampe, 2005; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987).
A partial list of image schemas contains examples such as path, verticality, equilibrium,
container, process, cycle, causality, tension, or substance. If we listen and observe carefully,
we notice that projections of such schemas upon other realms of physical experience are
the norm. Not surprisingly, we find the typical elements of schematic and figurative
thought also in the sciences (Amin, 2009; Brookes & Etkina, 2009; Fuchs, 2006, 2015;
Haglund, Jeppsson, & Ahrenberg, 2015). Temperature or speed is high or low
(example: the temperature keeps climbing); heat flows or can be transported (example:
in winter, we lose a lot of heat through the windows); heat is a fluid substance (example:
There’s too much heat in here, we have to make sure we can get rid of it); electricity,
water, and momentum can accumulate (example: the car has a lot of momentum);
momentum flows more strongly if the gradient of speed is steeper; and heat has power
(Sadi Carnot’s La puissance du feu, 1824). These and countless other expressions bear
witness to the fact that our imaginative mind is ‘all over’ the physics we learn and use.
3.2.3. Forces of nature
Recently, we have identified a figurative (schematic, imaginative) structure that makes its
appearance in our encounters with nature, our fellow humans and their cultures, or our
psyche. We are referring to the gestalt of force exemplified by notions of forces of
nature, and social, cultural, and psychological forces (Fuchs, 2006, 2011). Examples of
forces of nature are water, wind, heat, cold, motion, electricity, substances, and gravity.
The concept of force – which is not the concept of force in mechanics (see Note 2) – is
8 F. CORNI ET AL.
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structured in terms of metaphors using projections from the schemas of polarity (binary
opposites such as HOT <—> COLD), of FLUID SUBSTANCE, and of POWER, and others. The
experiential gestalt of force leads to the creation of imaginative structures such as FORCES
ARE AGENTS. It will be at the centre of arguments that physical theories are structured nar-
ratively (see Section 4), which will allow us to conceptualise our approach to mechanics in
the FiM IEL.
The message we must take away from modern cognitive science is that we neglect what
the mind makes available to us only at our own peril. Understanding science lies in the
deeper meaning of the exemplary expressions just presented. We cannot get away with
saying that the equations we use to work with in formal science represent a deeper
truth or a more objective approach to reality that our metaphors cannot provide. If we
want to understand, we will always have to refer results of formal manipulations and deri-
vations back to the figures made available to us by our embodied mind.
3.3. Narrative framing of natural scenes
The study of narrative in general and of stories and myths, or literature, in particular, is
certainly as old as Greek philosophy. However, there has been a growing effort in narra-
tology and in psychology to understand better how stories and the human mind interact
(Bruner, 1987, 1990; Dancygier, 2012; Herman, 2002, 2009a, 2013; Ricoeur, 1984).
Narrative in science learning has become an important field of inquiry. Most appli-
cations of narrative are extrinsic to science – such as when they are used for creating
affect and context (Klassen, 2006; Kubli, 2001, 2005). Where they are intrinsic, they are
often limited to special cases and uses (Norris, Guilbert, Smith, Hakimelahi, & Phillips,
2005). However, lately, there have been attempts at creating stories of forces of nature
as repositories of actual knowledge of physical processes, for the purpose of training kin-
dergarten and primary school teachers, and for the children in these schools (Corni, 2013,
2014; Corni & Giliberti, 2014; Corni, Fuchs, Giliberti, & Mariani, 2014).
To extend the reach of narrative in science, a hypothesis of narrative framing of natural
and technical scenes has been formulated (Fuchs, 2015). The term narrative framing is
used in a double sense, to represent (1) the enlisting of narrative intelligence in the percep-
tion of phenomena and (2) the telling of stories that contain conceptual elements used in
the creation of scientific models of these phenomena.
A particular notion of framing – as used in cognitive linguistics – originated in the work
of Fillmore (1975); it represents one of the early important steps towards what has become
known as cognitive linguistics. The earliest description of what could be meant by frame or
framing is still one of the most useful for our purpose:
I would like to say that people associate certain scenes with certain linguistic frames. I use the
word scene in a maximally general sense, including not only visual scenes but also […] enac-
tive experiences, body image, and, in general, any kind of coherent segment of human beliefs,
actions, experiences or imaginings. I use the word frame for any system of linguistic choices –
the easiest cases being collections of words, but also including choices of grammatical rules or
linguistic categories – that can get associated with prototypical instances of scenes. (Fillmore,
1975, p. 124; emphases in original)
This statement describes most succinctly what we have mentioned above: our mind is the
centre of interaction of action-perception feedback loops and loops of linguistic
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production and reception – words are not directly linked to the world out there, linguistic
meaning is indirect, tied to our (embodied) concepts.
As conceived of early in cognitive linguistics (Fillmore, 1975), the term framing is
applied to a novel theory of word meaning. In narrative framing of natural scenes, we
extend the notion of framing to apply as well to how our mind deals with the large-
scale imaginative products we call narratives. Concrete narratives are linguistic products
we use to talk about, and deal with, events that occur over longer periods of time in
larger spaces and in more complex systems. Narratives are large-scale as opposed to
medium-scale or small-scale linguistic products; medium-scale products appear in meta-
phoric networks with which we render, for example, the concept of force (in the sense
described above) without resorting to a full-fledged story, and small-scale linguistic pro-
ducts result, for instance, from the metaphoric projection of an image schema in simple
and short expressions (Fuchs, 2015; Fuchs, Corni, & Dumont, 2016).
We have suggested that complex concepts are not only structured in terms of small-
scale (simpler) elements (i.e. bottom-up structuring), but are fundamentally informed
by large-scale structures (top-down structuring). What we mean by force, agent,
agency, time, process, cycle, etc. becomes clear through our immediate comprehension
of narratives such as stories (Contini, 2015; Ricoeur, 1984). For science, we propose
that this view of the role of narrative for meaning leads to a number of important
issues. First, it must be possible to produce narratives (stories) that are triggers of concep-
tual knowledge regarding the working of agents in natural settings (Corni, 2013; Fuchs,
2015). Second, continuum physics should have a structure that contains all the elements
we would require of a narrative field – indeed, we can show this to be the case by a reading
of the equations of the physics of macroscopic dynamical systems that is inspired by
modern cognitive science (Fuchs, 2014). Third, and most generally and maybe most
importantly, we draw an analogy between the relation between story-worlds8 and
stories on the one hand and that of models and simulations of natural and technical
systems, on the other (Fuchs, 2015).9 In the same way that a story lets a listener create
a story-world (a mental model), simulations (mental, analytical, or computational)
suggest ideas concerning the properties of and relations between the quantities populating
models and theories. Quantities (variables, initial values, and parameters) in formal scien-
tific models are the counterparts of characters and scene descriptors in story-worlds.
These issues will be taken up in the following section of the paper that starts with a
description of the structure of the physics of macroscopic systems and processes.
4. Continuum mechanics, dynamical systems, and narrative
The scientific basis of the presentation of mechanical phenomena in the FiM lab is taken
from the most comprehensive form of a theory of extended materials and fields – conti-
nuum physics. Modern continuum physics started in the 1950s (Truesdell & Noll, 1965;
Truesdell & Toupin, 1960). Its development carried over into extended irreversible ther-
modynamics of (nonlinear) processes (Fuchs, 1996/2010; Jou, Casas-Vazquez, & Lebon,
2010; Müller, 1985; Truesdell, 1984) and is now a staple of advanced engineering
theory and practice.
There is a simpler form of theories of macroscopic processes that preserves much of the
generality of continuum physics: this is the theory of uniform dynamical systems obtained
10 F. CORNI ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
 de
gli
 St
ud
i d
i M
od
en
a e
 R
eg
gio
 E
mi
lia
 ] 
at 
23
:06
 03
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
by applying the equations for continuous media and fields to uniform bodies and regions
(control volumes). Examples of such approaches are the theory of uniform dynamical
models of thermal processes (Fuchs, 1996/2010), generalised forms of engineering analysis
(called systems approaches, see Richards, 2002), control engineering (Tyreus, 1999), or
those that apply to motion of finite uniform bodies and materials, or to the electrody-
namics of lumped circuits. Both continuum physics and the physics of uniform dynamical
systems answer – from the perspective of physics and engineering – the question of why
we choose momentum and angular momentum as primitives in our models of motion in
FiM.
4.1. The structure of continuum physics
From a purely formal perspective, the structure of continuum physics looks as follows. In
order to create a theory of continuous physical processes, we
[…] have to agree on which physical quantities we are going to use as the fundamental or
primitive ones; on their basis other quantities are defined, and laws are expressed with
their help. Second, there are the fundamental laws of balance of the quantities which are
exchanged in processes, such as momentum, charge, or amount of substance; we call these
quantities fluidlike. Third, we need particular laws governing the behavior of, or distinguish-
ing between, different bodies; these laws are called constitutive relations. Last but not least, we
need a means of relating different types of physical phenomena. The tool which permits us to
do this is energy. We use the energy principle, i.e., the law which expresses our belief that
there is a conserved quantity which appears in all phenomena, and which has a particular
relationship with each of the types of processes. (Fuchs, 1996/2010, p.9)
4.1.1. Fundamental quantities
The fundamental or primitive quantities used in a theory of continuum physics are those
that derive from an analysis of the gestalt of force applied to forces such as heat, electricity,
substances, and motion. In the case of heat as a force of nature, these are hotness (thermal
intensity), entropy (caloric: quantity of heat), conductive flux and radiative source rate of
entropy, and entropy production rate. For all other phenomena, there are, theoretically but
not necessarily in reality, analogous intensive and extensive quantities plus the conductive
fluxes, radiative source rate, and production rate. Most important for this paper is the case
of theories of motion. For linear motion, these quantities are velocity, (linear) momentum
(quantity of motion), conductive flux density of momentum (stress), radiative source rate
(body forces); the production rate of momentum is strictly zero.
Imaginative understanding of these quantities derives from embodied experience by the
projection of image schemas upon the phenomena in question. It should not come as a
surprise, then, that Newton started his exposition with quantity of motion and that the
most modern theories cast their basic relations in forms that make use of momentum
and the other fundamental quantities from the start.
4.1.2. Laws of balance
Laws of balance of the fluid-like quantities10 (entropy, charge, amount of substance,
momentum and angular momentum for the forces just listed) form the core of a
theory; their mathematical structure makes use of metaphoric projections of schemas of
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(fluid) substance, amount, container, surface, in-out, path (source-path-goal), collection,
and flow, to name the most obvious. This is attested to by examples of (natural) language
use in describing what a law of balance stands for. For example, a body (container) con-
tains a certain amount of momentum (fluid substance); it is separated from the surround-
ings by its surface (creating an in-out situation). As a result of an interaction, momentum
flows into or out of the body (through the surface) going from an initial to a final location
along a particular path (source-path-goal). Inflow adds to, outflow subtracts from the store
of momentum in the body (collection; see Lakoff and Núñez (2000) for a discussion of the
metaphoric basis of mathematical procedures such as addition and subtraction).
4.1.3. Constitutive relations
Constitutive relations make use of a large amount of schematic spatial and dynamic
knowledge (Fuchs, 2014). Just consider the examples of containment (of a fluid-like quan-
tity) and its effect upon intensity, and the conductive transport of fluid-like quantities.
Collecting and storing more entropy (caloric) in a body raises the thermal level (intensity:
temperature). The conductive current density of entropy depends upon (1) the local temp-
erature gradient that is understood in terms of the metaphor of a thermal landscape with
its highs and lows and steep or gentle slopes, and (2) how the nature of the path taken by
entropy enables or opposes its flow (note the force-dynamic schemas of letting, opposi-
tion, or resistance; see Johnson, 1987; and Talmy, 2000, for a detailed discussion of
force dynamic schemas). Verticality, tension, and force dynamic schemas conspire to
create an imaginative world in which we understand the constitutive equations of conti-
nuum thermodynamics and, by analogy, of mechanics.
4.1.4. Energy
Finally, energy makes its entrance upon the scene as the power of a force – this is Sadi
Carnot’s image of the waterfall explaining the notion of la puissance du feu (the power
of heat: Carnot, 1824). Caloric flows from a high to a low level – the strength of the
flow and the height of its fall combine to determine the power of a fall of heat (the rate
at which energy is made available in the fall of caloric, called availability in modern engin-
eering thermodynamics, see Bejan et al., 1996; Fuchs, 1996/2010). This is a concrete
example of the embodied knowledge that the quantity and the quality of a phenomenon
conjoined create its power. The equivalent concept in mechanics is that of stress power:
the rate at which energy is made available when momentum flows through a medium
from a point of higher to a point of lower velocity.
In macroscopic classical physics, the notion of energy is extended to include the con-
cepts of energy storage and transfer, allowing for a law of balance of energy to be formu-
lated. Importantly, it is assumed that energy can neither be produced nor destroyed: there
is no production term for energy in the expression of its balance.
4.1.5. Momentum, momentum transfer mechanisms, and forces
The following discussion concerns the relation between the notion of force in mechanics
and the basic conceptualisation of motion found in continuum physics. Simply put, we
want to know how the well-known F =ma fits with what we have said about the momen-
tum principle in continuum mechanics.
12 F. CORNI ET AL.
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If we rewrite the law of balance of momentum as it is formulated in continuum physics
for the case of uniform systems, we obtain
dp
dt
= I p,cond,net + I p,conv,net +
∑
p
(1)
(Fuchs, 1996/2010, Chapter 3 and p. 88). This is the result applicable to a typical form of
control volume analysis (for the material contained in a control volume) used in many
branches of engineering. As a special case, it entails the equations of balance of momentum
for a body.11 The conductive momentum current (or flux) Ip,cond,net is the integral of the
momentum current density tensor over the surface of the material (Landau & Lifshitz,
1959, p. 13), whereas Ip,conv,net is the sum of all convective momentum currents (a convec-
tive momentum current is the result of the momentum carried by the moving material
across the element boundary). Σp denotes the volume integral of the density of the
momentum source rate – it is the momentum source rate for the material under
investigation.
The difference between this and the short F =ma appears too great to be explained in a
single step. Therefore, let us take a look at the generalised form of Newton’s second law
(equation of motion) useful for control volume analysis in engineering (Bejan, 1993,
p. 220; Richards, 2002, Chapter 5). It is usually written in a form similar to
d
dt
(mv) = FS + I p,conv,net + FB. (2)
Note that we have already inserted the capacitive relation between momentum and speed
of a material, p =mv. Here, FS is the net surface force, i.e. the integral of the stress tensor
over the surface of the material. FB is the net body (or volume) force due to interaction of a
body and fields; it is the integral of the body force density over the volume of the material.
Ip,conv,net is the net convective momentum flux.
Equations (1) and (2) are equivalent. We simply use different terms when speaking
about the same imagistic concepts. We say stress tensor or (conductive) momentum
current density tensor when we describe the surface distribution of (conductive) momen-
tum transport across the surface of a material. Therefore, we say surface force or (conduc-
tive) momentum current when we mean the integral over the surface (of a material).
Equivalently, we say body force or (radiative) momentum source rate. Interestingly, the
word force is never used for convective momentum transports: convective momentum
currents are convective momentum currents, period. In our approach, momentum and
momentum transports form the core of the scientific and engineering conceptualisations
of motion. Force in mechanics is the term for two of the three forms of momentum trans-
fer: conductive and radiative (Fuchs, 1987).12
What we learn from this is that F =ma is a strongly simplified and limited version of the
generalised form of Newton’s second law (the equation of motion, Equation (2)). It does
not make explicit the distinction between surface and body forces. Importantly, it is not
possible to apply F =ma to open systems, it only applies to bodies – forces do not
change the mass of a system. The concept of force (augmented by mass and acceleration)
simply does not suffice to formulate the equation of motion as it is used in engineering and
applied science.
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In summary, our imaginative mind lets us think of amount of substance, entropy,
charge, momentum, and angular momentum as fluid-like quantities that are stored and
transported; there may be radiative forms of transport (entropy, momentum, and
angular momentum) or production of the quantity (entropy and amount of substance).
Energy accompanies all processes like a bookkeeper in a company who follows the phys-
ical work done. What is done and how it is done is not determined by the bookkeeper; only
how much can or will be done will be controlled by the bookkeeper.
4.2. System dynamics tools for modelling systems and processes
We make use of graphical computational tools for modelling of dynamical processes
known from system dynamics.13 Here we give a brief description of the approach afforded
by these tools that are important for several reasons. The graphical user interface for this
form of dynamical modelling provides an additional form of metaphoric language that is
used by tutors during Summer Schools (for selected high school students in Italy). Stu-
dents employ such programs there for explicit dynamical computer modelling of their
projects.
The notion of dynamics as the result of the storage, flow, and production of certain
quantities lends itself to graphical metaphorical projection. Today, system dynamics
tools provide user interfaces that make visual elements such as reservoirs (storage
elements) and flows (process quantities for transports and production) available to the
modeller (see Figures 3 and 4). A combination of a reservoir and one or more flows
sets up the first-order differential equation expressing a law of balance (see Figure 3).
Then, feedback loops between reservoirs and process quantities lead to full-fledged dyna-
mical models – linear or nonlinear (see Figure 4).
A typical example dealt with in Summer School is that of two gliders with repelling
magnets moving on a horizontal air track. On the left in Figure 3, we see a diagram of
a preliminary version of a system dynamics model. On the right, data and simulation
of the preliminary model are shown.
Momentum (p) of the two gliders is represented by the rectangular reservoirs. Speed (v)
is calculated on the basis of the instantaneous momentum and the mass (m) of a glider.
The interaction between the gliders (via the magnets), represented by the flow of momen-
tum (Ip_M), is modelled here as having constant strength during the period lasting from
Figure 3. First step in the creation of a dynamical model of the collision of two gliders on a horizontal
track carrying repelling magnets.
14 F. CORNI ET AL.
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about 0.75 to 1.85 s. During this period, momentum and speed change at constant rates
leading to a result that is only partially satisfactory. Steps leading to a satisfactory
model will involve connections that express our ideas what the strength of the momentum
current might depend upon. Note that initial and final speeds are calculated correctly. The
total momentum of the gliders is conserved. Note, as well, that we did not make use of the
balance of energy for calculating final velocities.
Now we create a second and better version of a model of the collision. The example
presented in Figure 4 assumes that the magnitude of the force (the magnitude of the
current Ip_M; M stands for magnet) is proportional to a certain power (n) of the distance
between the centres of the two magnets (delta x). The interaction between carts and track
were neglected – friction forces were set equal to zero in the concrete model – which
proved to be more than adequate (see the fit between a simulation run and the data
sets in the diagram on the right in Figure 4).
This means that we need to calculate the positions of the two gliders that can be used to
determine the distance between the magnets. The position of a glider is obtained by inte-
grating the velocity (v = p/m) over time and adding the initial position.14
The parameters of the model are the power (n) of the dependence of Ip_M upon the
inverse distance (delta x) and the factor of proportionality (k). Students can change
these values, repeat simulations, and compare the results to their experimental data. A
value of n = 5 gives the best fit for the experiment performed in this example.
The concrete example is rich enough in detail and of a type that may not be readily
found already solved in textbooks. Students can experience a situation that requires
actual creative construction of ideas whose consequences need to be tested – we have a
perfect situation of inquiry where our narrative mind plays an important role.
4.3. An imaginative approach to mechanics
Combining the conceptualisation of motion inherent in continuum physics with narrative
and other figurative forms allows us to design an imaginative approach to mechanics. Here
we will briefly describe the basic ideas that have been applied to the design of mental
models, explanations, and narrative forms used in FiM.
Figure 4. Experiment and model for two carts on a horizontal track colliding with repelling magnets
mounted to their fronts. Left: Diagram of the dynamical model (prepared with the program Stella).
Right: Speed of the carts as functions of time (data: circles; simulation: solid line).
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We have already outlined aspects of the conceptualisation of motion afforded by con-
tinuum mechanics (Section 4): we are certainly allowed, maybe even compelled,15 to think
of momentum and angular momentum as fluid-like quantities that are stored and trans-
ported; typically, all three types of transport, conductive, convective, and radiative, appear
in realistic and practical applications. If we are dealing only with closed systems, we do not
have convective transports and the equations of motion are a bit simpler than what we
described in Section 4.
This lets us design imagistic elements to be used in mental models and explanations of
concrete phenomena (i.e. for simulations of such cases). Importantly, we can imagine
momentum and angular momentum to be the agents (of change) in mechanical pro-
cesses.16 They are fluid-like agents whose action and reaction in mechanical situations
tells the story of what is happening. Importantly, the story has explanatory power.
4.3.1. A story of a stuck truck
Consider the following example of a case of linear motion – it will give us an impression of
how motion can be modelled using the approach outlined here (this is similar to examples
dealing with linear motion in a couple of stations in FiM; however, we feel that the example
chosen here is better known to our readers). A passenger car pushes a stalled truck into
town. (This is the situation proposed for Question 15 of the revised (1995) version of the
Force Concept Inventory problem testing student understanding of Newton’s third law.
See Hestenes et al. (1992).) The car starts moving slowly towards the truck from behind
– the engine pumps momentum from the ground for the car to raise its speed. When the
car touches the truck, the parts touching are compressed and stressed somewhat –momen-
tum begins to flow through them from the car into the truck. Briefly, the car comes to a
standstill, its wheels spin. Momentum continues to be pumped but must flow back to the
earth through the wheels of the truck – car and truck do not move.
Eventually, the wheels of the car grip the surface of the street and the momentum
pumped by the engine flows into the car and the truck – both car and truck become
faster, the momentum accumulating in them makes them move together at the same
speed. As they move together, there is a lot more momentum in the truck compared to
in the car. Since there is resistance between vehicles and the air and the street, momentum
is continually lost. It must be continually replenished by pumping through the car’s engine
and it continues to flow from the car to the truck keeping the amounts of momentum in
the car and the truck constant. (In this story, Newton’s third law is implied: momentum
leaving the car through the parts touching the truck enters the truck; the flow of momen-
tum out of the car equals the flow of momentum entering the truck. Students find this
conclusion a no-brainer.)
In this story, we recognise momentum both as an agent and as a patient – how it acts
and suffers in the (story-)world suggests some of its properties and those of related con-
cepts such as speed, speed difference, change of speed, mechanical stress, and friction. The
role of energy is hinted at in the part where the engine pumps momentum from the
ground to the vehicles.
4.3.2. Informal learning and natural language
Remember that the design is meant to allow for informal learning. This has consequences
for the use and the form of language in speaking about mental models and simulations of
16 F. CORNI ET AL.
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motion. Adjectives (high-low) are used for intensity and tension, large-small (much-little)
for amount, a noun for amount (agent), power (strong-weak) for causal strength. If we are
aware of this in designing mental models, we gain both in understanding and in our ability
to use good language for speaking naturally about what is commonly considered a formal
scientific affair (Corni et al., 2014). Much of the power of good language rests in its ability
to evoke appropriate and useful images.
4.3.3. Modelling and narrative
Now consider what the use of system dynamics modelling is telling us about the relation
between mechanics (as an example of macroscopic physics) and narrative. Modelling tools
that make use of system-dynamics graphical interfaces support the integration of narrative
and formalism in two interesting ways. First, they give us access to metaphoric represen-
tations of relations that make up a model. Secondly, as has been pointed out by Morgan
(2001, 2012) and Wise (2011), modelling and simulation are narrative activities – they
differ from older forms of physical science where examples can be solved purely by analyti-
cal means. This difference is felt most strongly in fields of science where nature has a
history such as in earth science, astronomy, or biology (Glennan, 2010; Norris et al.,
2005), or in the science of complexity (Wise, 2004). When approached from the perspec-
tive of modern narratology, we can show that models correspond to story-worlds and
simulations are stories told in these worlds (Fuchs, 2015). The combination of a
problem-based learning environment with system dynamics modelling lets students get
a taste of a narrative approach to physical science.
5. Investigations of learning of mechanics in IELs
The model of learning of mechanics in an activity-based environment such as the IEL pre-
sented here should allow us to formulate questions for future investigations. How should
IELs be designed – both physically and conceptually? What is the nature and quality of
learning that can take place in such environments? What are particular cognitive challenges
we should pay attention to? At this point, we shall primarily discuss the last of these points.
Note that the points, or challenges, we identify change if we change our vantage points:
from typical school physics to continuum physics, from formal approaches to linguistics to
cognitive linguistics, or from literary theory to modern narratology. Many of these changes
seem to be directly related to a shift in perspective from disembodied to embodied
cognition.
5.1. Understanding motion
We should not kid ourselves: understanding mechanics is difficult, no matter how we try
to accomplish the task. Many aspects of this difficulty are known from previous research
into science learning (Clement, 1982; Halloun & Hestenes, 1985; Hestenes et al., 1992;
McDermott, 1984). The view commonly taken is that the form of mechanics taught in
schools is a veridical version of our knowledge of the world of motion; in fact, it is the
only possible version and learners should simply adapt to its formalism if they want to
master the science. Whatever conceptions learners bring with them that do not agree
with standard wisdom must be misconceived.
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When viewed from the perspective of continuum physics, mechanics does not magi-
cally turn out to be simple. However, the questions we ask as educators about why this
is so are different; the challenges we see turn out to be different (see, for example, Bur-
khardt, 1987; Fuchs, 1987). Learners have to deal with geometrically demanding situations
(motion in three dimensions); distinguish between linear and rotational motion and then
join the descriptions in cases where the two forms of motion are combined; and, very
importantly, find ways not to confuse the extensive mechanical quantities (momentum
and angular momentum) with energy and then learn how energy relates to mechanical
processes. All of these difficulties need to be overcome in an environment where the
usage of natural language differs fundamentally from formal practice (Brookes &
Etkina, 2009).
The main difference in answers to the challenge of mechanics (and physics) seems to be
this: Traditionally, we assume that the very core concepts of novices are somehow wrong –
misconceived. In our view, it appears that our embodied mind provides us with many useful
concepts whose formalisation and application in demanding situations pose the real pro-
blems for learners. For this reason, we suggest that research into learning and understanding
of mechanics in an IEL such as the one at Ducati should concentrate upon the form and
usefulness of basic embodied concepts of motion demonstrated by students. We want to
know, above all, how learners form images of momentum, angular momentum, and
energy in motion, and their relation. Starting from this point, we then have to research
how veritable formal difficulties can be overcome so a larger proportion of young students
can create a sense of achievement when confronting mechanics in school.
5.2. The role of (natural) language
No doubt, language is always important. Science educators will certainly agree with this
statement but, in general, very little will be done to integrate language education with
science learning. In fact, science is often seen as a realm where a student can shine even
if he or she struggles with natural language. Natural language and the forms of under-
standing it entails can apparently be circumvented by mathematical formalisms that are
assumed to carry the true message of a mathematical science such as physics.
In addition, science has created its own form of natural (non-mathematical) language
that can be almost as daunting for novices as mathematical formalisms. Halliday (2004),
Halliday and Martin (1993), and Lemke (1990) have analysed the development of form
and use of natural language in scientific discourse. They point out how, for instance, nomi-
nalisation turns what could be natural everyday language into a forbidding form of dis-
course for learners – language anticipates and mimics the formalisms used in the
presentation of mathematical and non-mathematical sciences alike.
In contrast to this state of affairs, a figurative and narrative (i.e. generally imaginative)
approach to science has no direct need for formalising spoken or written natural language.
Rather, we want to make use of the grammatical and semantic tools provided by our
languages to evoke the images upon which formalisms can be built should that be necess-
ary. We believe that in this manner, a narrative approach can be used to bring together
science and language education, particularly for young learners (Corni, 2013).
Again, more research will be needed to confirm, contradict, or qualify these statements.
Lately, science education researchers have become aware of the importance and utility for
18 F. CORNI ET AL.
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learning and understanding of conceptual metaphor and other issues raised by cognitive
science in general and cognitive and functional linguistics, in particular (Ascari, Corni, &
Ceroni, 2015; Amin, 2009; Amin et al., 2015; Brookes & Etkina, 2009; Fuchs, 2006). This
type of research points in the direction of what it means to employ natural language in
science.
In a nutshell, we need to be concerned with questions of how to make use of the power
of natural language for learning about mechanics in IELs, and if it makes a difference to
the quality of learning if this power is harnessed.
5.3. Narrative understanding
Much research in cognitive science has gone into describing our narrative mind, what it is,
how it functions (Bruner, 1987, 1990; Velleman, 2003), and how we may make the most of
it in the context of science learning (Klassen, 2006; Kubli, 2001, 2005; Metz, Klassen,
McMillan, Clough, & Olson, 2007; Norris et al., 2005). Most of the applications of narra-
tive in science have been concerned with stories about science rather than stories in which
the concepts found in a science unfold.
This is perhaps not surprising. Influenced and guided by Bruner’s famous distinction
between narrative and paradigmatic modes of thought (Bruner, 1987, 1990), and philoso-
phers’ insistence that stories give us emotional closure, not intellectual understanding
(Velleman, 2003), we seem to be hard pressed to find a way that lets us integrate narrative
modes of thought with doing science. However, recent studies have pointed us beyond the
narrower view in the direction of the workings of our narrative mind in science proper
(Fuchs, 2015; Morgan, 2001, 2012; Wise, 2004, 2011).
This allows us to ask questions that are particularly relevant for our purpose: what is
the role of the notion of agency and agents in macroscopic physical science? How does
agency relate to development of a sense of causality, or vice versa? What is the relation
between our knowledge of agents (characters) such as momentum and understanding
of the story schema? How important is a direct experience of macroscopic physical
(mechanical) phenomena for the development of a sense of large-scale narrative
schemas in our minds (Corni, 2013)? We still do not know enough about these
issues and we do not have enough concrete data to assess to what extent narrative
understanding supports understanding of physical phenomena such as motion in IEL
learning environments.
5.4. Embodiment, perception, language, and learning
As mentioned in the first paragraphs of this section, the new questions all relate more or
less directly to the hypothesis of embodied cognition. Researchers who work in this field
tell us how the interaction of our organisms with our environment(s) leads to a conceptual
structure that can be expressed in language and other forms. Cognitive linguistics is one of
the more recent research traditions that have taken up the issue of how we recognise
embodiment and its consequences for understanding. Again, science education research
has taken note of this in recent years (Amin, 2009; Amin et al., 2015; Fuchs, 2006; Hes-
tenes, 2006). In our view, it is important that researchers and educators begin asking
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questions that are motivated by this embodied line of research in cognitive science and
education.
6. Summary and outlook
In this paper, we described the foundations of a narrative approach to mechanics in an IEL
– continuum physics and system dynamics modelling on the one hand and cognitive
science, linguistics, and narratology on the other. The actual use of the laboratory was
described only briefly with an example of the type of investigations that can be performed
there. In short, the IEL provides a learning environment that combines aspects of kinaes-
thetic experience with mental modelling stressing imaginative forms of conceptualisation
of mechanical processes. The rationale for the last point is that imaginative forms of
rationality connect experience and (macroscopic continuum physics) models more
directly than traditional school physics does.
Obviously, the expectation expressed in this last sentence will need to be investigated in
depth. The work on the IEL has progressed to a point where we can start with didactic
research of the actual learning that is occurring in the lab.
To conclude, we hope that examples of learning environments such as the IEL at Ducati
can encourage more teachers to try modern approaches to mechanics and embark on
research in embodied cognition in science education. We need to increase the extent
and depth of our experience with the challenges and opportunities encountered in the
learning of mechanics, not the least for the reasons why Ducati built the lab in the first
place: to educate the next generations of young people so a technical culture may continue
to live and thrive in Northern Italy.
Notes
1. See http://www.ducati.it/fisica_in_moto.do for a link to FiM.
2. Briefly put, the idea underlying the model of an embodied mind is this. The mind of an indi-
vidual is fundamentally shaped by the physical and social interactions of an organism with its
physical, social, and cultural environments. Physics is considered a cultural construct that
reflects, like all other cultural products, the nature of our embodied mind. Put still differently,
physics is a product of our imagination, i.e. of the figurative forms our mind creates as a result
of our perception of natural phenomena. (See the following paragraph, and Section 3, for
much more detail concerning the issue of embodiment.)
3. Note that in this context, the term force does not denote anything like a force in mechanics.
Rather, it reflects human perception of agentive phenomena that are covered by a much more
general meaning of the word force. There is an instance of this in the second paragraph of this
Introduction: ‘ … physics is an… enterprise that forces us to use examples… .’ So, here,
physics is a perceived as a force of the type we mean when we refer to natural, social (cul-
tural), or psychological forces.
4. Narratives of physical phenomena combined with embodied approaches are known to some
extent from museum pedagogy (see Stevens & Hall, 1997). See also the example of an amuse-
ment park in Italy where groups of students visit the attractions and stations guided by a tour
guide and collect data with sensors. They actually feel the accelerations, make measurements
of physical quantities, and are encouraged to engage in discussions: http://mirabilandia.it/en/
node/155.
5. The Fisica in Moto laboratory consists of 12 experimental stations. They include the
Hammer Test (temporal course of impact of a hammer on a surface), Arm Wrestling
(relation between forces and torques), Sliding Cubes (inertia, momentum, friction),
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Frictionless Chairs Ring (collisions and recoil), Carts on Tracks (collisions), Angular
Momentum Carousel (pumping angular momentum, friction, change of moment of
inertia), among others.
6. Conclusions of this form are typically the result of verbal interactions between laboratory
tour guides and the students visiting the lab. Note that students will have worked on
examples of linear motion before this and are accustomed to using narrative forms that
employ images of momentum.
7. Good introductions to the field can be found in Amin (2009) and in the Special Issue on Con-
ceptual metaphor and embodied cognition in science learning in IJSE (Amin et al., 2015). See
also Brookes and Etkina (2009), Jeppsson, Haglund, Amin, and Strömdahl (2013), and Trea-
gust and Duit (2015).
8. Narratologists make an important distinction between stories and story-worlds (Herman,
2002). Story-worlds are mental models. The relation between story and story-world has
been described as ‘Storyworlds can be defined as the worlds evoked by narratives, and nar-
ratives can be defined in turn as blueprints for world-creation’ (Herman, 2009b, pp. vii–x).
9. On the relation between narrative, models, and simulation in economics, see Morgan (2001,
2012), and in computational physics and chemistry, see Wise (2011).
10. The term ‘fluidlike’ was introduced by Fuchs (1996/2010) to denote what has been called
‘substancelike’ in an innovative physics course for high school (The Karlsruhe Physics
Course; Falk, Herrmann, & Schmid, 1983; Herrmann, 2000; Schmid, 1982, 1984). It
denotes a subset of the extensive quantities of continuum physics for which laws of
balance can be formulated.
11. If we allow for open systems (flow systems or elements), we have to distinguish between
bodies and control volumes (or the material contained therein). We will use the term body
for the material of a closed system (i.e. one not allowing transport of mass into or out of
the element). We will refer to open systems by the terms control volume or material.
12. Whether or not we use the word force, and if so, how, is an altogether different matter having
to do with choices that are anything but simple and clear cut. A particular choice will depend
upon many factors, age and sophistication of our students, goals for the physics and engin-
eering to be learned, form of the learning environment, cognitive goals, and philosophical
stance.
13. System dynamics is an approach to dynamical systems that developed from control engin-
eering and cybernetics in the Servomechanisms Group at MIT in the 1940s (Forrester,
1961; Wiener, 1948). It has since been used extensively in the social sciences. With the
advent of graphical user interfaces, tools have been created that employ visual metaphors
for reservoirs and flows (plus additional variables) for designing dynamical models (examples
of such tools are Stella (iseesystems.com), Berkeley Madonna (berkeleymadonna.com), and
InsightMaker (insightmaker.com)). Mathematically speaking, these tools allow us to
produce initial value problems in ordinary differential equations and have them solved
numerically for extensive simulation exercises.
14. In typical system dynamics tools, an integrator is created by using the elements that let us
express laws of balance – reservoirs and flows. The important difference between the graphi-
cal expression for a law of balance on the one hand and a simple integrator on the other is
this: in a law of balance a number of flows may appear each of which represents a particular
interaction taking place; in an integrator, we only have a single rate of change that is being
integrated. In Figure 4, the rate of change is dx/dt = v.
15. Who, or what would make us think that way? There is much evidence in modern cognitive
science that it is our mind that leads us in this direction. Considering this possibility – that it
is quite inevitable that our mind generates these embodied structures of science for us – is an
important and exciting challenge for philosophy, education, science, and technical culture.
16. Note that we do not advocate personification of these ‘agents.’ Rather, if we make use of
natural language to speak about the structures found in continuum physics (and mechanics),
this language will – according to cognitive analyses – make use of figurative structures that
correspond to the images we are discussing here. We cannot avoid using conceptual
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metaphors and larger narrative forms when speaking about motion, i.e. when we model and
simulate mechanical processes. On the notion of agency in emotion and cognition, see Boyer
(2007) and Newman, Keil, Kuhlmeier, and Wynn (2010).
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